Mary Doe, Guardian Ad Litem for Jane Doe v. Roberto v. Arguelles, et al. : Petition For Rehearing by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) 
1986 
Mary Doe, Guardian Ad Litem for Jane Doe v. Roberto v. Arguelles, 
et al. : Petition For Rehearing 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2 
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the 
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act, 
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.David L. Wilkinson and Carlie Christensen; Attorneys for 
Defendants and Petitioners 
Recommended Citation 
Petition for Rehearing, Doe v. Arguelles, No. 19061 (1986). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4612 
This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARY DOE, Guardian ad Litem 
for JANE DOE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-v-
ROBERTO v. ARGUELLES, et al., 
Defendants-Petitioners. 
Case No. 19061 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
GEORGE M. HALEY 
HALEY & STOLEBARGER 
Tenth Floor Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
CARL IE CHRISTENSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Petitioners 
FILED 
JAN 101986 
Clerk, S\lprame Court. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
--------------------------------------------------
MARY DOE, Guardian ad Litem 
for JANE DOE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-v-
ROBERTO v. ARGUELLES, et al., 
Defendants-Petitioners. 
Case No. 19061 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
GEORGE M. HALEY 
HALEY & STOLEBARGER 
Tenth Floor Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys tor Plaintiff/ 
A[.;[J(llant 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
CARLIE CHRISTENSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Petitioners 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
OF ISSUES ------------------------------------ 1 
STATEMEN'I OF THE CASE ---------------------------------- 1 
ST/,TEME:n· OF FACTS ------------------------------------- 2 
SUMW,RY OF ARGUMENT ------------------------------------ 2 
POINT I THIS COURT IMPROPERLY CONSIDERED ISSUES 
WHICH WERE NOT PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL 
COURT OR BRIEFED BY THE PARTIES ON APPEAL. 3 
POINT II THE DECISION IN ARGUELLES EFFECTIVELY 
ELIMINATES APPLICATION OF THE DISCRE-
TIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION TO ALL 
GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITIES, CONTRARY TO 
THE INTENT AND PURPOSE OF THE UTAH 
GOVERNMENTAL IMi'lUNITY ACT. ------------------- 11 
CONCLUSION --------------------------------------------- 15 
CASES CITED 
Board of Education of carbon County School 
District v. Bryner, 
5/ Utah 78, 192 P. 627 (Utah 1920) ------------------ 14 
Butz \', Economou, 
4 3 i'\ u. s. 4 7 8 ( 19 7 8) -- --- ------ ----------------------- 6 
rrLt:t \'. Ccirbet, 
47:! P.2c.i 430 !Utah 1970) 3 
,K \'. Anderson, 
Sr.S P.2J 908 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) ------------------- 4 
111 \'. Nielson, 
!. ,,t d1 JS/, 129 P. 619 (1913) 2 
( l) 
Frank v. State, 
613 P. 2d 517, 519 (Utah 1980) ------------------------ 14 
Hall v. Schaeffer, 
556 F.Supp. 539 (E.D. Penn. 1983) --------------------
Larson v. Dartnell, 
448 N.W.2d 249 (Ill.App.Ct. 1983) -------------------- 6 
Little v. State Division of Family Services, 
667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983) -------------------------- 14 
New Mexico Department of Human Services v. Tapia, 
642 P.2d 1091 (N.M. 1982) ---------------------------- 11 
Nielson v. Vashon Island School District No. 402, 
558 P.2d 167 (Wash. 1976) ---------------------------- 4 
Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guaranty 
Insurance Underwriters, Inc., 
380 P.2d 135 (Utah 1963) -----------------------------
State v. Theison, 
19 U.A.R. 14, No. 20598 (Utah, Sept. 26, 1985) ------- 4 
Thompson v. County of Alameda, 
614 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980) ----------------------------- 6 
Trotter v. Klincar, 
748 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984) ------------------------
United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao 
Area Rio Grandense, 
104 s.ct. 2755, 2765-69 (1984) ----------------------- 14 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-30-1011) ---------------
Section 64-6-1.l ------------------
Section 64-6-10 -------------------
Section 77-18-1(1) ----------------
Section 77-27-5 -------------------
10, u 
7 
Section 77-27-1113) --------------- b 
( i l) 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
PAGE 
Utah Constitution, Article V, § 1 ----------------------- 14 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 35 -------------- 2 
(ill) 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----------------------------
1:1,u·· DUL, Guardian ad Litem 
;, r .1M;f DUL, 
Plc1ntift-Appellant, 
-',/-
v. ARGUELLES, et al., 
Deiendants-Petitioners. 
---------------------
Case No. 19061 
Petitioners, State of Utah and Ronald Stromberg hereby 
subro-.1t the following Petition for Rehearing to the Supreme Court 
of tne State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether this Court improperly addressed issues not 
to the trial court or briefed on appeal. 
2. Whether this Court overlooked the far-reaching and 
certain impact which its decision will have on the discretionary 
fJ:1ct1on exception of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
STATEMENT OF THE CA5E 
The Tnird District Court, the Honorable Philip R. 
i1;:,tilu presiding, granted the state defendants' motion for 
'"·"r] luayment on the following grounds: 
1. The decision to release the defendant Roberto 
'· '. l, 1 r urr1 the Youth Development Center (hereafter YDCJ was a 
1 11•ncJ r/ function for which the state defendants are immune 
r:.u1L; ctnd 
2. The decision to release the defendant Roberto 
'· • ·· ii urr. the YDC was a quasi-Judicial function for which 
' 1·1 defendants are immune from suit. 
(A copy of the Order is attached as Appendix A). 
The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the Third 
District Court and in Doe y. Arguelles, No. 19061 (Utah, Decembet 
27, 1985), this Court affirmed that portion of the trial court's 
ruling which held that the decision to release Roberto Arguelles 
from the YDC was a discretionary function and therefore, the 
state defendants were immune from suit. However, this Court went 
on to find that the implementation of the release decision was 
ministerial in nature and therefore, the defendants were not 
immune from suit under the discretionary function exception. (A 
copy of the full opinion is attached as Appendix Bl. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioners hereby incorporate by reference the 
statement of facts contained in Respondents' Brief, 
(Respondents' Brief, pp. 1-18). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provides that a petition for rehearing "shall state with 
particularity the points of law or fact which the Court has 
overlooked or misapprehended." In Cu!!®ings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 
157, 129 P. 619 <1913), this Court stated: 
•.• a rehearing should not be applied for, 
unless we have misconstrued or overlooked 
some material fact or facts, or have 
overlooked some statute or decision which may 
affect the result, or that we have based the 
decision on some wrong principle of law, or 
have either misapplied or overlooked 
something which materially affects the 
result. .•. 
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4; Utah at 172-173, 129 P. at 624. These authorities establish 
"'"ta petition for rehearing should be granted where the 
,ctit1uner has identified a specific point of law or issue of 
tact which the Court has neglected or misconstrued or which 
r,aterially affects the outcome of the case. Petitioners submit 
in the present case, this Court overlooked a basic principle 
o! 1udicial review and addressed issues which were not properly 
bet ore the Court on appeal. In so doing, the Court failed to 
consider the dramatic affect which its decision will have on the 
Ctall Governmental Immunity Act and on governmental programs 
generally. Petitioners submit that these omissions satisfy the 
rigorous standard established by this Court for granting a 
for rehearing and that said petition is properly before 
the Court and should be granted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT IMPROPERLY CONSIDERED ISSUES WHICH 
WERE NOT PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT OR 
BRIEFED BY THE PARTIES ON APPEAL. 
It is a fundamental principle of appellate review tnat 
issues not contained in the record shall not be considered for 
the first time on appeal. Corbet y. Corbet, 472 P.2d 430 (Utah 
19701; Reliable Furniture Co. y, Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance 
l.l.nderwr1ters. Inc., 14 Utah 2d 169, 380 P.2d 135 (Utah 1963) • 
In the context of a motion for summary judgment, the 
rr1al r_r"at should be accorded the first opportunity to rule upon 
ues ctnd theories advanced by the 1 itigants. Issues which were 
11 ut ,,1esented to nor ruled upon by the trial court in granting a 
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summary judgment cannot be raised by the parties for thE: first 
time on appeal to secure reversal of the judgment. Nielson vL 
Vashon Island School District No. 402, 558 P.2d 167 (Wash. 19761; 
Crook v. Anderson, 565 P.2d 908 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977). 
This Court has repeatedly held that it will not 
consider points and contentions not raised in the trial court. 
State y, Theison, 19 U.A.R. 14, No. 20598 (Utah, Sept. 26, 1985). 
Yet in the present case, this Court has done the very thing which 
it forbids litigants to do. 
In the Arguelles decision, this Court concluded that 
defendant, Ronald Stromberg's "decision to place Arguelles fell 
into the category of functions designed to be shielded under the 
discretionary function exception, and his decision should not be 
questioned in a court of law." Arguelles at p. 3. This issue 
was the only issue properly before this Court on appeal. 
However, the Court's opinion does not end there. The Court went 
on to hold that if the plaintitf's ward's inJuries were 
proximately caused by Stromberg's "negligence in monitoring the 
prescribed treatment" after making the discretionary decision to 
release Arguelles, he would not be immune from suit under the 
discretionary function exception. Arguelles at p. 4. This point 
of law was never raised by the pleadings, in discovery or in the 
legal arguments advanced by the parties. The first time that the 
issue was ever raised by plaintift was in her Reply Brief on 
appeal. 
Even a cursory review of the trial court record 
evidences the fact that plaintitf's theory of liability did not 
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iide negligent implementation of the release decision . 
.. ,'"Lilt's complaint alleges that the YDC was charged with the 
cr1,nc.ibility of confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of 
tne defendant Roberto Arguelles. (R. 4l. The complaint further 
aJ!eges that defendants, Ron Stromberg, Ralph Garn, Russ Vanvleet 
and Jeff McBride, who were employees of the YDC, were responsible 
tor Arguelles' confinement, treatment and release. (R. 4). The 
complaint then alleges that the conduct of these employees as it 
related to the conf inernent, treatment and decision to release 
anO/O[ parole Roberto Arguelles was negligent, grossly negligent 
and in reckless disregard for the lives and safety of plaintiff's 
ward and other members of the public. (R. 4-6). Thus, from the 
outset of this lawsuit, plaintiff's theory was that the employees 
of tne YDC did not properly rehabilitate Arguelles while he was 
·cnf1ned at the YDC and therefore, the decision to release him 
•a5 unreasonable. Plaintiff never alleged that the supervision 
·r Arguelles after his release was negligent or was the proximate 
cause of plaintiff's injuries. 
The extensive discovery conducted during this case 
tJrtnu substantiates petitioner's claim. The record is 
'l tuaJ ly devoid of any discovery which indicates the manner in 
cl1 thE. release decision was implemented. Plaintiff deposed 
'.'r,Junts Stromberg, Garn and Vanvleet, all YDC officials and 
.,cue, who consistently testified that the responsibility for 
1'1len1ent1ng the release decision rested with the parole officer. 
''>c test1m0ny of these witnesses also specifically identified the 
c cit f icer assigned to Roberto Arguelles and identified the 
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parole officer's two immediate supervisors. (See Deposition of 
Ron Stromberg, pp. 71-73; Deposition of Ralph Garn, pp. 44-45; 
Deposition of Russell Vanvleet, p. 51, copies of those portions 
of the depositions are attached as Appendix Cl. Yet, 
interestingly enough, none ot these individuals were ever named 
as defendants in the complaint or deposed by the plaintiff during 
the lengthy discovery process. Thus, there is absolutely no 
testimony on the record from anyone who had personal knowledge of 
how the release decision was actually implemented. 
This omission from the record is significant for two 
reasons. First, it establishes conclusively that the question of 
negligent post-release supervision was not at issue in the case. 
Second, without any evidence on the record as to the 
specific activities which the parole officer performed, it is 
impossible for this Court to determine as a matter of law that 
implementation of the release decision was ministerial in nature. 
The availability of immunity does not depend on the formal 
description of the official's activities or the importance of the 
position held by a public official, but rather on the tunctional 
nature of the activities which that official performs. Butz y. 
Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). Numerous state and federal 
jurisdictions have extended the doctrines of discretionary 
function and quasi-Judicial immunity to a variety of activities 
performed by probation and parole officers even when those 
activities did not involve a release decision. y. 
County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980) (post-release super-
vision constitutes a discretionary function); Larson y. Dartnell 1 
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448 N.w.2d 249 <Ill.App.Ct. 1983) (parole supervision held to be a 
discrdionary function); Trotter v. Klincar, 748 F.2d 1177 (7th 
,: 1 ,. 1984) <participation in a parole revocation procedure held to 
De d quasi-Judicial function); and Hall y. Schaeffer, 556 F.Supp. 
539 1£.D. Penn. 1983) (request by a parole officer for issuance ot 
a warrant is a quasi-judicial function). 
This Court presumably attempted to overcome this 
deficiency in the record by assuming that because the YDC had 
legal custody of students who had been discharged from the 
school, the YDC and its employees were responsible for 
supervising the students upon their release. (Arguelles at p. 
4J. However, at the time Arguelles was released from the YDC, 
tne controlling legislation provided that a student at the YDC 
may be conditionally released from residency within the center to 
live outside the center "under the supervision of an officer of 
tne center or other person designated by the superintendent .•.. " 
!Emphasis added). Utah Code Ann. § 64-6-1.1. Another section of 
the act entitled "Community Placements" provided that students 
placed in the community would remain in the legal custody of and 
under the supervision of the Division of Family Services. Utah 
Code Ann. § 64-6-10. (A copy of these statutes are attached as 
At-['endix D). In the present case, Stromberg, as the 
s.per1ntendent of the YDC and in accordance with applicable law, 
lle!eqated responsibility for Arguelles' supervision in the 
l-0""""rn1r_y to a parole officer. The parole staff, at that time, 
'" 'lndu the direction of the Division of Family Services not 
U,c \'DC, The Division of Family Services, by statute, had legal 
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responsibility for supervising youth in community placements. 
Therefore, the Court's assumption that Stromberg was responsible 
for post-release supervision is not supported by the controlliny 
legislation at that time. 
Moreover, this conclusion reflects a basic 
misunderstanding of the operation of the criminal and juvenile 
justice systems. In Utah, the state courts, by statute, have 
legal custody of probationers. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1111. The 
courts retain jurisdiction over probationers and have the 
authority and power to issue warrants for the arrest and 
detention of any probationer who violates the conditions of 
probation. Yet, the court is not legally responsible for 
implementing the release decision or ensuring that a probationer 
complies with the conditions ot his release. That responsibility 
is delegated to the Department of Corrections' probation office. 
Similarly, the Board of Pardons has legal 
responsibility for establishing when and under what conditions 
inmates at the Utah State Prison are released on parole. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-27-5. The Board retains jurisdiction over 
parolees once released and has the power and authority to issue 
warrants for their arrest and detention when they violate the 
terms of their conditional release. Utah Code Ann. §77-27-1113). 
Yet the Board has neither the ability or authority to "implement" 
its release decisions. The responsibility for parole supervision 
ha"s been delegated to the Department of Corrections. 
Accordingly, in Arguelles, the mere fact that the YDC 
haa legal custody of and retained Jurisdiction over a student who 
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tiarl been released from the school, did not establish legal 
"oof!''nsibility for supervision of that student after release. 
record evidences that, even though the YDC, like the courts 
1 " 0 the lloard of Pardons had the ability to issue process for the 
airest and detention of individuals who violated the terms of 
their conditional release, the YDC was entirely dependent on the 
parole staff to report any violations and to implement the 
conditions of release. Thus, this Court's determination that 
defendant Stromberg was responsible for implementing release 
does not comport with the applicable legislation or the 
facts contained in the record. Rather, the law and the facts 
establish that Stromberg was not legally responsible for 
implementing the release decision and that the conduct of those 
who were responsible was never before the trial court and 
theretore, improperly considered by this Court. 
Finally, the legal arguments advanced by both parties 
at the trial court level and on appeal establish that the only 
issue properly before this Court for resolution under the Govern-
"'ental Immunity Act was whether the decision to release Arguelles 
irorr, the YDC was a discretionary function. Defendants' memoran-
durr, in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment states: 
Thus, the only real issue was whether the 
decision to release Roberto Arguelles on 
December 19, 1979 was proper. 
1P. Plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to defendants' 
Mct1on for Summary Judgment identifies the same issue. (R. 314). 
At the oral argument in district court on defendants' 
"L1un fvr summary Judgment, both parties agreed that the issue 
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before the Court was whether the decision to release Arguelles 
from the YDC was a discretionary function (R. 339, 412). 
Plaintiff did not advance nor was there any discussion 
the theory that the defendants' supervision ot Arguelles after 
his release was ministerial. No legal authority was cited in 
support of or contrary to such a theory. 
On appeal, the docketing statement submitted by 
plaintiff and on file with this Court identif ieo the only issue 
for resolution under the Governmental Immunity Act as follows: 
a. Whether or not Judge Philip R. 
Fishler was correct in ruling as a matter of 
law that the decision of Ronald Stromberg, 
individually and on behalf of the Utah State 
YDC, to release defendant Roberto Arguelles 
from YDC was a discretionary function and, 
therefore, would have immunity from suit 
pursuant to u.s.c. § 63-30-10(1) ; •••. 
Finally, as evidenced by the briefs on file with this 
Court, the sole issue presented for resolution under the 
Governmental Immunity Act was whether the decision to release 
Arguelles was a discretionary function; Not whether the 
implementation of that decision was a discretionary function. 
(See Appellant's brief, pp. 25-32 and Respondents' brief, pp. 18-
27). Neither party submitted the issue of post-release 
supervision to this Court in their original briefs. Nor did the 
parties cite any legal authority in support of or contrary to 
that theory, despite the wealth of instructive case law which 
exists on this issue. It was not until the plaintiff filed her 
Reply Brief on appeal that the issue of post-release supervision 
was raised. Thus, even though neither the trial court nor the 
defendants had the opportunity to address the issue, the Court's 
decision turned on this single 
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Petitioners submit that given the existing record in 
r.is case and the fact that neither the trial court or the 
11 tPn<iants had the opportunity to address the issue upon which 
11,1s case was ultimately decided, this Court should affirm the 
summary Judgment on the issues presented by the parties or 
alternatively, grant petitioners' request for a rehearing to 
f'Jlly brief and argue the question of whether post-release 
superv1s1on in this case was a ministerial act. 
POINT II 
THE DECISION IN ARGUELLES EFFECTIVELY 
ELIMINATES APPLICATION OF THE DISCRETIONARY 
FUNCTION EXCEPTION TO ALL GOVERNMENTAL 
ACTIVITIES, CONTRARY TO THE INTENT AND 
PURPOSE OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
ACT. 
When courts take it upon themselves to raise, argue and 
decide legal questions not addressed by the parties, they risk 
overlooking important facts, legal considerations and practical 
consequences which may result from a decision rendered without 
brnef it of a complete record and thorough briefing. See 
of Human Services y, Tapia, 642 P.2d 1091 (N.W. 
ln2J. As petitioners set forth above, this Court's decision in 
ArgJelles turned on a point of law not addressed by the parties. 
£y gc•ing outside of the record and beyond the briefs submitted by 
:Le peirt1es, this Court overlooked the devastating and certain 
irnv" t its decis1or, would have on the discretionary function 
'•;'ttt _1,11 oi the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and the practical 
ilect Ile aec 1 s 1on would have on the many and varied operations 
-' 1 •.tatc and local government. 
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In Arguelles, this Court held that Stromberg's decision 
to release Arguelles from the YDC was discretionary and therefore 
he was immune from suit. This Court also held that Stromberg's 
implementation of his own discretionary decision was ministerial, 
and that he was not entitled to immunity on that basis: 
Because a probation 
decisions are discretionary, he is immune 
from suit arising from those decisions. 
However, his acts the 
must be considered on a case-by-case basis to 
determine whether they are ministerial and 
thereby outside the immunity protections. 
Arguelles at 4 (emphasis added). Thus, individuals responsible 
for decision-making at the policy level may make a decision and 
be immune from suit, but cannot implement that decision without 
being potentially liable. This Court thus holds that a 
government officer's thought processes are protected from suit. 
He (or she) may ponder, ruminate, consider, evaluate, and come to 
a decision, write it down or discuss it with colleagues and in 
committees, without fear of liability because the discretionary 
function exception of the Utah Governmental Irr,muni ty Act 
(§ 63-30-10 ( 1) (a)), protects the decision, the decision-maker and 
the decision-making process. 
Yet, Arguelles also holds that as soon as the decision-
maker attempts to implement that rolicy decision, its 
discretionary characteristics disappear. The thought turns to 
action, the action becomes ministerial in 11ature and immunity is 
gone. (Arguelles at 5). In Stromberg's case, he could to 
release Arguelles and be immune from suit but he could not 
release Arguelles and retain immunity. 
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This result is, of course, absurd. To hold, as this 
:curt has in Arguelles, that a policy-maker is immune from suit 
ic.• ti1e thought processes involved in the making of a decision, 
1:,,t t11at the same individual can be liable for the implementation 
of that decision, is to effectively eliminate any application of 
governmel!tal immunity for discretionary function. No decision, 
policy, or thought process, in and of itself, ever caused injury 
or daruage to a potential plaintiff. It is through active 
1mr·lementation of a policy or decision that inJury may result. 
Every discretionary decision, unless it forever remains 
aormant and is never implemented or acted upon, will become 
n1nisterial at the time of implementation, and, at that time, 
according to this Court 1 s holding in Arguelles, the immunity, 
which attached at the decision-making stage, disappears. All a 
need do in a suit against a governmental entity to 
avoid application of the statute and defeat a summary judgment in 
fovur uf the governmental entity, is to plead that a governmental 
ott1cial, no matter his rank, implemented a decision, policy or 
Objective, and that the imi:-lementation was negligent. By doing 
so, plaintiff would effectively thwart the immunity protections 
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Consequently, the law as 
1t telates to the discretionary activities of government would 
11:n:c. no ef tect, and would be, for all intents and purposes, null 
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This result is contrary to recent pronouncements from 
the United States Supreme Court. (See United States v. S.A. 
de Viacao Area Rio Grandense, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 2765-69 
(1984), interpreting the discretionary function exception of the 
Federal Tort Claims Act). An interpretation that this Court has 
stated on numerous occasions it would follow. See Little v. 
State Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983); 
Frank v. State, 613 P. 2d 517, 519 (Utah 1980). 
This result is also contrary to the obvious intent of 
the state legislature. The legislature enacted the discretionary 
function exception within the Governmental Immunity Act for a 
purpose. After Arguelles, the exception has no purpose. As the 
legislature enacted it, the discretionary function exception has 
meaning, function and a long history of application and 
interpretation in federal courts, in other state Jurisdictions, 
and in Utah. This Court is required by its own edict to give 
force and effect to "every word and phrase" of a statutory 
provision. Board of Education of Carbon County School District 
v. Bryner, 57 Utah 78, 192 P. 627 (Utah 1920), The decision in 
Arguelles does Just the opposite. In emasculates the 
robs it of any force and effect, and its practical 
application in every conceivable case where plaintiff properly 
pleads allegations of negligent implementation of policy. In 
effect, this Court has repealed the discretionary function 
ex()eption of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. This 
legislative act by the Court violates Article v, § 1 of the Utan 
Constitution. The state legislature enacted the discretionary 
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10r,rt1c•n exception and this Court has no authority to repeal it 
without declaring it unconstitutional. No such 
cieclaration is found in Arguelles nor could this Court have 
11 ,1ended such a result when it unanimously decided Arguelles. 
must be given to the far-reaching and drastic 
of the decision. This issue is too important to be 
summarily treated without benefit of a thorough examination of 
tre legal issues involved and the policy considerations at stake. 
CONCLUSION 
In Doe y. Arguelles, this Court decided a significant 
legal issue which had not been presented by the pleadings, the 
record or the arguments on appeal. The resolution of this issue 
effectively eliminated the force and effect of the discretionary 
tunct10n exception of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Such a 
d;astic result should not attain from issues never properly 
adaressed before either the District or Supreme Court. 
Tt1erefore, petitioners respectfully request that this Court 
affirm tne summary judgment on the issues presented by the 
or alternatively, grant petitioners' application for 
fEJ,ear ing. 
Dated this 'OtVi day of January, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
CARLIE CHRISTENSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and exact 
, ies of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing, postage prepaid, 
r,e1irqe M. Haley, HALEY & STOLEBARGER, Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
lants, Tenth Floor Walker Center, 175 South Main Street, 
Lake City, Utah 84111, on this the day of January, 
i 9 8fi. 
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